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DATA LIVE: DATA BREACHES AS 
ARTICLE III INJURIES 
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INTRODUCTION 
In the first six months of 2019, organizations suffered over 3,800 
data breaches, up fifty-four percent from 2018.1 Unsurprisingly, identity 
theft is America’s fastest-growing crime.2 Hackers who coordinate 
cyberattacks stand to gain significant wealth by either misusing data or 
selling it to hostile parties, leaving victims vulnerable to fraudulent use 
of their data.3 In July 2019, for example, Capital One suffered a breach 
in which a hacker gained access to approximately 100 million credit 
card accounts and applications in the United States, including social 
security and bank account numbers.4 The Capital One breach likely 
affected anyone who applied for a credit card in any year from 2005 
through 2019.5 
To respond to data breaches, harmed consumers have some 
recourse available. The hacker behind a data breach—assuming he or 
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 1.  James Sanders, Data Breaches Increased 54% in 2019 So Far, TECHREPUBLIC (Aug. 15, 
2019, 7:35 A.M.), https://www.techrepublic.com/article/data-breaches-increased-54-in-2019-so-
far/. 
 2. United States Postal Inspection Service, Identity Theft, UNITED STATES POSTAL 
INSPECTION SERV. TIPS & PREVENTION, https://www.uspis.gov/tips-prevention/identity-theft/ 
(last visited Dec. 8, 2019). 
 3. Thomas Brewster, Hackers Behind A 770 Million Mega Leak Are Selling 10 Times More 
Data—But Don’t Panic, FORBES (Jan. 21, 2019, 6:36 A.M.), https://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/thomasbrewster/2019/01/21/hackers-who-leaked-collection-1-are-selling-10-times-more-
data-but-you-dont-need-to-panic/#7aeaed477c15; Arjun Kharpal, Hackers Are Selling Your Data 
on the ‘Dark Web’ . . . For Only $1, CNBC (Sept. 23, 2015, 11:15 A.M.), 
https://www.cnbc.com/2015/09/23/hackers-are-selling-your-data-on-the-dark-web-for-1.html. 
 4. Information on the Capital One Cyber Incident, CAPITAL ONE, https://www.capital 
one.com/facts2019/ (last updated Sept. 23, 2019, 4:15 P.M.). 
 5. Id. 
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she can actually be found—will likely face federal or state criminal 
liability and may be forced to pay restitution.6 But a compromised 
organization entrusted with the information may also be at fault for 
facilitating or allowing the unauthorized data exposure, and victims 
often turn to federal class action suits against such organizations to 
seek redress.7 These data breach lawsuits are growing in number each 
year as more data breaches affect more consumers.8 
Courts, however, do not even agree on whether or when data 
breach victims can sue, or in other words, when the victims suffer 
cognizable legal injuries that create Article III standing.9 To many 
courts, plaintiff-victims cannot sue until they prove that they were 
already, or are absolutely about to be, victims of a subsequent injury 
occurring long after the original data breach, such as identity theft.10 
Courts differ in defining how much apparent or actual subsequent 
harm is sufficient for standing, but none to date have held that a data 
breach alone, regardless of subsequent harm, can cause a cognizable 
common law injury. The Third Circuit has come the closest, holding that 
a data breach may cause an inherently cognizable injury when a federal 
statute is implicated. But no court has extended that approach to state 
statutory or common law claims.11 The current array of approaches is 
based largely on differing interpretations of Clapper v. Amnesty 
International USA, a 2013 Supreme Court case where a class of 
 
 6. E.g., Equifax Data Breach Settlement, FED. TRADE COMM’N (Jan. 2020), 
https://www.ftc.gov/enforcement/cases-proceedings/refunds/equifax-data-breach-settlement; 
United States Dep’t of Justice Off. of Pub. Affairs, U.S. Charges Russian FSB Officers and Their 
Criminal Conspirators for Hacking Yahoo and Millions of Email Accounts, UNITED STATES 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE (Mar. 15, 2017), https://www.justice.gov/opa/pr/us-charges-russian-fsb-officers-
and-their-criminal-conspirators-hacking-yahoo-and-millions. 
 7. See David Balser et al., INSIGHT: Data Breach Litigation Trends to Watch ¶ 10, 
BLOOMBERG LAW (Mar. 4, 2019, 4:01 A.M.), https://news.bloomberglaw.com/privacy-and-data-
security/insight-data-breach-litigation-trends-to-watch (“Some of the most noteworthy data 
breach litigation developments in 2018 were large consumer class action [data breach] 
settlements.”). 
 8. See id. (“[T]he scale of litigation and regulatory investigations directed towards data 
security will continue to expand.”). 
 9. See infra Part II (discussing circuit split). 
 10. See, e.g., In re U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt. Data Sec. Breach Litig., 928 F.3d 42, 58–59, 75 
(D.C. Cir. 2019) (discussing cases from other circuits and ultimately finding that plaintiffs had 
standing); Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 273 (4th Cir. 2017) (“Our sister circuits are divided 
on whether a plaintiff may establish an Article III injury-in-fact based on an increased risk of 
future identity theft. The Sixth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits have all recognized, at the pleading 
stage, that plaintiffs can establish an injury-in-fact based on this threatened injury . . . . By 
contrast, the First and Third Circuits have rejected such allegations.”). 
 11. See infra Parts II.A and II.B (reviewing circuit courts that have found plaintiffs have 
standing for data breach lawsuits). 
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individuals alleged that they would be wiretapped by the federal 
government. In Clapper, the plaintiffs did not have standing because 
the alleged wiretapping was not “certainly impending” and, even more, 
because those plaintiffs had relied on a chain of speculative 
assumptions.12 Some courts have used this precedent in data breach 
cases to refuse to find standing when plaintiff-victims only allege that 
because of a data breach, they face an increased risk of, rather than 
already-occurred instance of, misuse of their personal information.13 In 
part, the refusals to find standing are because fraud or other harm 
following a data breach may take years to manifest and will affect an 
uncertain number of people.14 
This Note argues for a different approach from any currently 
articulated by courts: that data breach victims suffer inherently 
cognizable legal injuries the moment that their information is disclosed 
without their consent. A data breach itself, without allegations of future 
misuse of personal information, generally creates a common law injury. 
This approach is proper even when a data breach does not lead to 
subsequent harm. Data breaches fit neatly into the framework of long-
recognized privacy torts in which damages are presumed. Data breach 
victims may also have standing under breach of contract theories. To 
that end, it is inappropriate to apply Clapper to data breach suits 
because a data breach is generally an adverse event that has already 
occurred, not a wholly speculative future occurrence. Although 
enactment of a federal data privacy statute would certainly alleviate 
standing questions that plaintiff-victims face, there is simply no need 
for such legislation for standing purposes alone. In essence, if a data 
breach case is dismissed because the plaintiff-victims fail to plead what 
are, in effect, meritorious claims, that determination should be under 
Rule 12(b)(6), at summary judgment, or after trial. Suits should not be 
dismissed under the false idea that the plaintiff-victims did not suffer 
cognizable legal injuries. 
Holding that data breach plaintiff-victims have standing is 
consistent with the doctrine of standing. Standing is a separation of 
 
 12. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409–10 (2013). 
 13. See infra Part II.C (discussing the third approach in which courts find that plaintiffs do 
not have standing). 
 14. See, e.g., Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 45 (3d. Cir. 2011) (discussing the “entirely 
speculative” nature of alleged data misuse); Lily Hay Newman, The WIRED Guide to Data 
Breaches ¶ 4, WIRED (Dec. 7, 2018, 9:00 A.M.), https://www.wired.com/story/wired-guide-to-
data-breaches/ (“Even after a data breach has occurred, though, and an unauthorized actor 
definitely has your data, you won’t necessarily see an immediate negative impact.”). 
WASSERMAN FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/2020  10:46 AM 
204 DUKE JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW & PUBLIC POLICY SIDEBAR [VOL. 15 
powers principle initially articulated in the early 1920s15 that ensures 
courts do not usurp powers of the political branches of the United 
States government.16 Essentially, courts decide specific disputes before 
them about distinct injuries17 and cannot rule on hypothetical 
questions. Otherwise, courts would be legislating for future scenarios, 
thereby infringing the powers reserved to Congress.18 However, data 
breach lawsuits pose no such risk. They are based on a past controversy 
in which victims’ information was disclosed without their authorization, 
and any future harm, such as identity theft, stems from that past event; 
no conjecture is needed, at least for determining whether victims did in 
fact suffer harm.19 Determining the alleged risk of future harm 
following a data breach is not a question of standing but rather of 
causation and damages: whether the alleged risk of future harm is 
proximately tied to the data breach and to what degree the data breach 
ultimately harmed plaintiffs.20 For this reason, courts should find that 
data breach incidents, alleged future harm from them, and costs to 
mitigate that future harm are sufficient injuries to satisfy standing 
requirements. Otherwise, victims of data breaches may not even be let 
into court to adjudicate liability. 
In this Note, Part I provides a relevant background on Article III 
standing. Part II surveys and analyzes the current circuit split over 
whether and when data breach plaintiffs have standing. Part II also 
organizes the current approaches to standing into three categories. 
Then, Part III sets out the Note’s main argument, which is that those 
three existing approaches to standing are improper. And so, Part III 
 
 15. See Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 488 (1923) (“The party who invokes the 
[judicial] power must be able to show, not only that the statute is invalid, but that he has sustained 
or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as the result of its enforcement, and 
not merely that he suffers in some indefinite way in common with people generally.”); Fairchild 
v. Hughes, 258 U.S. 126, 129 (1922) (“Plaintiff’s alleged interest in the question submitted is not 
such as to afford a basis for this proceeding. It is frankly a proceeding to have the Nineteenth 
Amendment declared void.”). 
 16. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 408–09. 
 17. See John G. Roberts, Jr., Article III Limits on Statutory Standing, 42 DUKE L.J. 1219, 
1224–25 (1993) (discussing how conjectural, hypothetical, or possible future harm does not meet 
Article III standing requirements). 
 18. See id. (“We accept the judiciary’s displacement of the democratically elected branches 
when necessary to decide an actual case.”). 
 19. Jennifer M. Joslin, The Path to Standing: Asserting the Inherent Injury of the Data Breach, 
2019 UTAH L. REV. 735, 749 (2019) (“[A standing] inquiry is unnecessary when courts recognize 
an injury based on the theft of plaintiffs’ personal information, irrespective of potential fraudulent 
misuse of that information.”). 
 20. In re Zappos.com, Inc., 888 F.3d 1020, 1029 (9th Cir. 2018); Remijas v. Nieman Marcus 
Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 696 (7th Cir. 2015). 
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then sets out a “fourth” and proper approach to data breach standing. 
That is, plaintiffs have federal standing under common law the moment 
that a data breach occurs. Such immediate standing is appropriate for 
two primary reasons. First is that data breaches constitute tortious 
violations of privacy where injuries and damages may be presumed. 
Second is that data breaches may be violations of obligations to protect 
data, which are grounded in contract law. Part III then asserts that, 
because data breaches are in and of themselves injurious, Clapper’s 
“imminence” test for standing does not apply to data breach lawsuits. 
Finally, Part IV provides policy arguments that support finding that 
plaintiffs have standing in these cases. 
I. ARTICLE III STANDING & RISK OF FUTURE HARM 
To litigate in federal courts, a plaintiff must satisfy the constitutional 
requirement of Article III standing.21 Standing is grounded in 
separation of powers principles and ensures that federal courts 
adjudicate primarily “[c]ases” or “[c]ontroversies.”22 In other words, 
federal courts may only resolve actual, ongoing disputes between 
parties.23 If courts decided questions where no actual controversy 
existed, they would be “making law” broadly over hypothetical 
situations, usurping the other federal branches’ power.24 
In practice, standing depends on whether the plaintiff has suffered 
a cognizable legal injury,25 which rests on three elements. The plaintiff’s 
alleged injury must be an “injury in fact,”26 “fairly traceable to the 
challenged action,” and “redressable” by a favorable court ruling.27 The 
most important of these elements is establishing the existence of an 
injury in fact.28 If the plaintiff cannot show they suffered an injury in 
 
 21. Standing is a separate doctrine from Rule 8 pleading standards. Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 
490, 500 (1975) (“Although standing in no way depends on the merits of the plaintiffs’ contention 
that particular conduct is illegal, it often turns on the nature and source of the claim alleged.”); 
Wilding v. DNC Servs. Corp., 941 F.3d 1116, 1128 (11th Cir. 2019) (“Whether a plaintiff has 
Article III standing is a question distinct from whether she has a statutory cause of action.”). 
 22. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. 
 23. Patrick J. Lorio, Note, Access Denied: Data Breach Litigation, Article III Standing, & A 
Proposed Statutory Solution, 51 COLUM. J.L. & SOC. PROBS. 79, 83 (2017) (citing Warth v. Seldin, 
422 U.S. 490, 498 (1975)). 
 24. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 408 (2013). 
 25. See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992) (discussing injuries that 
create standing as “legally cognizable injuries”). 
 26. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1548–49 (2016). 
 27. Clapper, 568 U.S. at 409. 
 28. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1547 (calling establishment of an injury in fact the “first and 
foremost” element of standing). 
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fact, traceability and redressability need not be analyzed.29 Whether an 
injury in fact exists requires that the alleged harm is (1) particularized, 
(2) concrete, and (3) actual or imminent.30 
A. Particularized 
An injury is particularized when it affects the plaintiff as a person 
and individual, rather than as an angry third-party or public observer.31 
A suit to enforce the invasion of a private right, like trespass, 
presumably passes muster; such private rights inherently belong to 
individuals.32 However, a plaintiff cannot bring a suit to enforce a right 
in the general public interest without also alleging how he or she was 
personally harmed.33 For example, a plaintiff cannot sue a government 
agency for failing to follow a regulation merely because the violation 
harmed the “public at large.”34 Even when a community in aggregate 
might practically be affected by a government’s regulatory violation, a 
plaintiff still must demonstrate he or she was personally injured.35 In 
data breach cases, a plaintiff’s ability to show a particularized injury has 
not historically been an issue. 
B. Concrete 
Concreteness entails an independent inquiry into whether an injury 
is “real, and not abstract,” or that it practically and actually exists.36 
Concreteness, as the Supreme Court most recently explained in 
Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins,37 hinges on both historical practice and whether 
 
 29. See Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561 (“Since they are not mere pleading requirements but rather 
an indispensable part of the plaintiff’s case, each element must be supported in the same way as 
any other matter on which the plaintiff bears the burden of proof, i.e., with the manner and degree 
of evidence required at the successive stages of the litigation.” (emphasis in original)). 
 30. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1548–49. 
 31. Id. at 1548. 
 32. See id. at 1551 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“In a suit for the violation of a private right, 
courts historically presumed that the plaintiff suffered a de facto injury merely from having his 
personal, legal rights invaded. Thus, when one man placed his foot on another’s property, the 
property owner needed to show nothing more to establish a traditional case or controversy.” 
(emphasis in original)). 
 33. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 573–74 (“We have consistently held that a plaintiff raising only a 
generally available grievance about government—claiming only harm to his and every citizen’s 
interest in proper application of the Constitution and laws, and seeking relief that no more directly 
and tangibly benefits him than it does the public at large—does not state an Article III case or 
controversy.”). 
 34. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1551–52 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 35. Id. 
 36. Id. at 1548–49 (majority opinion) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
 37. Id. at 1548–50. 
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Congress defined a particular right via statute.38 And, although a 
tangible injury like physical harm is quickly recognized as concrete, an 
injury need not be tangible to be concrete. For example, violations of 
constitutional free speech and free exercise rights are concrete 
injuries.39 Similarly, if a statute mandates that certain information be 
publicly available, and individuals cannot obtain that information, a 
concrete harm exists.40 
Recently, the Supreme Court in Spokeo laid out a framework for 
determining the concreteness of injuries for statutory violations.41 In 
Spokeo, a “people search engine” named Spokeo, Inc. had disseminated 
information about the plaintiff, Thomas Robins, that was allegedly 
inaccurate.42 Robins subsequently sued Spokeo under the federal Fair 
Credit Reporting Act, theorizing that his statutory right to handle his 
credit reporting information was violated.43 Initially, the district court 
dismissed Robins’s suit for a lack of standing, but the Ninth Circuit later 
found that Robins did have standing because he suffered an 
individualized and particularized harm.44 However, the Supreme Court 
ultimately held that the Ninth Circuit’s analysis was incomplete 
because it had failed to consider the “concreteness” of Robins’s alleged 
injury, and so the Court remanded the case for a new and full standing 
analysis.45 Under Spokeo, Congress may, via statute, create new 
cognizable legal injuries,46 but a bare procedural violation may result in 
no actual harm. Therefore, a plaintiff does not automatically show 
concrete injuries every time a statute is violated.47 Courts must take 
care to examine a plaintiff’s theory of harm. 
 
 38. Id. at 1549. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. (citing Fed. Election Comm’n v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 20–25 (1998)). 
 41. Id. at 1550. 
 42. Id. at 1544. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. at 1544–45. 
 45. Id. at 1545. 
 46. Id. at 1549 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992)) (“Congress 
may ‘elevat[e] to the status of legally cognizable injuries concrete, de facto injuries that were 
previously inadequate in law.’” (emphasis in original)); Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 514 (1975) 
(“Congress may create a statutory right or entitlement the alleged deprivation of which can confer 
standing to sue even where the plaintiff would have suffered no judicially cognizable injury in the 
absence of statute.”). 
 47. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (“Congress’ role in identifying and elevating intangible harms 
does not mean that a plaintiff automatically satisfies the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a 
statute grants a person a statutory right and purports to authorize that person to sue to vindicate 
that right.”). 
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After the Supreme Court remanded Spokeo for the Ninth Circuit 
to reconsider standing, the Ninth Circuit offered one possible 
interpretation of the Supreme Court’s framework using a two-part test. 
First, courts must ask whether Congress established the statute in 
question to protect concrete interests, as opposed to merely procedural 
rights; and second, if the answer to the first question is affirmative, 
courts must check whether the violation in question harms or presents 
a risk of material harm to those concrete interests.48 Notably, the 
Supreme Court in Spokeo also confirmed that the mere “risk of real 
harm” could be one such concrete injury.49 Spokeo thus provides insight 
into how courts should examine data breach cases. The concreteness of 
an alleged injury, and therefore standing, depends largely on which 
injuries a plaintiff alleges, congressional purposes for any statutory 
provision in question, and the nature of common law rights violated.50 
C. Actual or Imminent 
Finally, an alleged injury must be “actual or imminent.”51 That is, 
the alleged injury must have already occurred, be ongoing, or, if an 
injury is alleged to be in the future, it must be more than just 
“possible.”52 This requirement is particularly relevant in data breach 
cases when allegations include the risk of future identity theft. In 
Clapper v. Amnesty International USA, the Supreme Court outlined 
when an injury might be actual or imminent.53 Clapper’s facts differ 
from those of data breach cases, but it is nonetheless an important case 
because some circuit courts choose to rely on it in data breach suits. 
In Clapper, a group representing human rights, labor, legal, and 
media organizations challenged the constitutionality of Section 702 of 
the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.54 Section 702 authorized the 
United States to undertake warrantless wiretapping for foreign 
intelligence purposes.55 The plaintiffs sued the United States before 
 
 48. Robins v. Spokeo, Inc., 867 F.3d 1108, 1113 (9th Cir. 2017) (“[W]e thus ask: (1) whether 
the statutory provisions at issue were established to protect his concrete interests (as opposed to 
purely procedural rights), and if so, (2) whether the specific procedural violations alleged in this 
case actually harm, or present a material risk of harm to, such interests.”). Ultimately, the Ninth 
Circuit found that Robins had standing. Id. at 1118. 
 49. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (emphasis added). 
 50. Id. at 1549–50. 
 51. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013). 
 52. Id. 
 53. Id. at 401, 408–09. 
 54. Id. at 401, 406–07. 
 55. Id. at 403. 
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actually having their communications intercepted and merely alleged 
there was an “objectively reasonable likelihood” that their 
communications would be acquired “at some point in the future.”56 The 
Supreme Court held the plaintiffs lacked standing.57 The plaintiffs had 
no knowledge that the government had “targeted” their particular 
communications, nor was there any past occurrence of harm.58 
Accordingly, the plaintiffs had not suffered actual or imminent harm 
but merely unsubstantiated fears.59 
The Court explained that the imminence requirement for an injury 
in fact is “a somewhat elastic concept,” but an alleged future injury 
cannot be stretched so far to be wholly speculative.60 If so, claims of risk 
of future injury, or preventative measures to address thereof, are 
insufficient.61 The Supreme Court obliquely described two potential 
standards for claimed future harms to satisfy the imminence 
requirement. The first and stricter standard is that an injury must be 
“certainly impending.”62 The second potential standard, however, 
merely requires plaintiffs to show a “substantial risk” that harm will 
occur, even when it may not be certain that harm will ever come 
about.63 Under either potential standard, plaintiffs cannot simply allege 
an “attenuated chain of inferences” that lead to some future harm.64 
It is not clear when exactly the “substantial risk” standard applies, 
even to circuit courts that have split on how to understand Clapper’s 
framework. In part, the uncertainty is because the Court discussed the 
possibility that the two standards are not entirely separate.65 The Court 
stated that “[i]n some instances, we have found standing based on a 
‘substantial risk’ that the harm will occur, which may prompt plaintiffs 
to reasonably incur costs to mitigate or avoid that harm.”66 But “to the 
extent that the ‘substantial risk’ standard is relevant and is distinct from 
 
 56. Id. at 407. 
 57. Id. at 420, 422. 
 58. Id. at 410. 
 59. Id. at 420, 422. 
 60. Id. at 409 (quoting Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 565 n.2 (1992)) 
(“Although imminence is concededly a somewhat elastic concept, it cannot be stretched beyond 
its purpose, which is to ensure that the alleged injury is not too speculative for Article III 
purposes—that the injury is certainly impending.” (emphasis in original)). 
 61. Id. at 401, 409. 
 62. Id. at 401. 
 63. Id. at 414 n.5. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Id. 
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the ‘clearly impending’ requirement, respondents fall short.”67 The 
Clapper Court applied the “certainly impending” standard, but 
application to other areas of law is uncertain. The data breach circuit 
split is in part over whether Clapper governs those cases and, if so, 
which standard applies. 
II. CURRENT APPROACHES TO DATA BREACH STANDING 
Circuit courts have split on when plaintiffs bringing claims 
following data breaches have standing.68 The split concerns whether—
and how much—an increased risk of future harm following a data 
breach is an injury in fact sufficient for standing. Different circuits 
utilize one of three contrasting approaches. However, each approach is 
analytically improper in virtually all data breach cases. Even when 
courts have determined that data breach plaintiff-victims have 
standing, which is the correct result, the means and reasoning under 
which they do so are improper. And so, this Note suggests in Part III a 
fourth approach not currently endorsed by any court. 
The first approach is that a data breach may constitute an “actual” 
injury but only when plaintiffs bring claims under a federal statute. 
Under this approach, Clapper need not apply, and it is unnecessary to 
evaluate the imminence of future harm.69 The second approach is a 
lenient standard of “substantial risk” analysis: A data breach victim 
may have suffered an injury in fact because, although plaintiffs must 
show they face subsequent imminent harm, that bar is low.70 Third is 
that a data breach alone is not evidence of an injury: A plaintiff must 
show conclusively that a given data breach has led to looming or actual 
identity theft, fraud, blackmail, or other harm.71 
A. First Approach: A Data Breach Can Be Inherently Injurious 
The first approach, currently adopted by only the Third Circuit, is 
that data breach plaintiffs might have standing for actual injuries if a 
 
 67. Id. 
 68. See, e.g., Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64, 80 (1st Cir. 2012) (“The courts of appeals 
have evidenced some disarray about the applicability of this sort of ‘increased risk’ theory in data 
privacy cases.”). 
 69. To date, this first approach has only been advanced by the Third Circuit. In re Horizon 
Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 629, 640 (3d Cir. 2017). 
 70. To date, this second approach has been followed at least once by the Fourth, Sixth, 
Seventh, Ninth, and District of Columbia Circuits. See infra Part II.B. 
 71. To date, this third approach has been followed at least once by the Second, Third, Fourth, 
Eighth, and Eleventh Circuits. See infra Part II.C. 
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federal statute is implicated. In In re Horizon Healthcare Services, the 
Third Circuit held that being the victim of a data breach can be an 
injury in and of itself, sufficient for standing, if the cause of action is 
under a federal statute like the Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970 
(“FCRA”).72 The majority opinion did not cite Clapper.73 Instead, the 
court relied on Spokeo, noting that Congress has the power to define 
injuries with legislation, in which case a substantive statutory violation 
constitutes cognizable harm.74 In Horizon, thieves stole two laptops 
containing credit card information from a health insurer.75 Plaintiffs 
brought suit under FCRA, which requires that consumer reporting 
organizations take reasonable steps to ensure the accuracy and 
integrity of consumer information.76 The court found that the plaintiffs 
had standing regardless of whether the disclosure of information would 
cause future harm because the plaintiffs alleged “unauthorized 
dissemination of their own private information—the very injury that 
FCRA is intended to prevent.”77 That is, “[e]ven without evidence that 
the Plaintiffs’ information was in fact used improperly, the alleged 
disclosure of their personal information created a de facto injury.”78 
The court compared data breaches to privacy torts in explaining 
why a FCRA violation was inherently an injury in fact. The court 
explained that “with privacy torts, improper dissemination of 
information can itself constitute a cognizable injury.”79 That invasion of 
privacy, which is an intangible harm, “has traditionally been regarded 
as providing a basis for a lawsuit in English or American courts.”80 
Congress, in enacting FCRA, sought to protect against injuries closely 
related to that long-recognized intangible harm, so a substantive FCRA 
violation was inherently sufficient for standing.81 
The Third Circuit subsequently clarified the Horizon holding. For 
plaintiffs to have de facto standing under a federal statute, they must 
allege that the statute in question protects rights “of the same character 
as a previously existing” injury.82 In a data breach case, that means the 
 
 72. The Fair Credit Reporting Act of 1970, 15 U.S.C. § 1681–1681x (2018). 
 73. Horizon, 846 F.3d at 634. 
 74. Id. at 638, 640. 
 75. Id. at 630. 
 76. Id. at 631. 
 77. Id. at 640. 
 78. Id. at 629. 
 79. Id. at 638–39. 
 80. Id. at 639–40 (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016)). 
 81. Id. 
 82. Kamal v. J. Crew Grp., Inc., 918 F.3d 102, 114 (3d Cir. 2019). 
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statute must protect against the unauthorized disclosure of personal 
information to a third party.83 
The Horizon court also limited this standing approach to federal 
statutory violations because common law claims were not at issue.84 The 
court stated that despite its discussion of privacy torts, it was “not 
suggesting that Horizon’s actions would give rise to a cause of action 
under common law.”85 In particular, “[n]o common law tort proscribes 
the release of truthful information that is not harmful to one’s 
reputation or otherwise offensive.”86 However, even if Horizon had 
involved common law claims, it is unlikely that the Third Circuit would 
have held differently. Several years before Horizon, the Third Circuit 
held in a different data breach case that plaintiffs who brought common 
law claims did not have standing.87 Examining the Third Circuit’s cases 
together, it is left open, albeit unlikely, that the court might consider a 
data breach as creating a de facto injury under common law. 
B. Second Approach: Proving Imminence is a Low Bar 
Second, other courts have found standing for another reason: that 
although data breach plaintiffs must still demonstrate that subsequent 
future harm is imminent, the burden is low.88 These courts use the 
“substantial risk” standard from Clapper and generally find that 
plaintiffs face a substantial risk of identity theft or fraud as soon as 
hackers hold stolen information, regardless of whether the claims are 
statutory or under common law.89 Pursuant to this approach, there is 
“no need to speculate”90 whether plaintiffs have standing because of 
the “obvious potential” for misuse of stolen data.91 As the Seventh 
 
 83. Id. 
 84. See Horizon, 846 F.3d at 639–40 (discussing statutory, rather than common law, harms 
and explicitly denying that the opinion’s standing analysis necessarily applies to common law 
claims). 
 85. Id. at 639. 
 86. Id. 
 87. Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 42 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 88. E.g., Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 622 (D.C. Cir. 2017); Remijas v. Nieman 
Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Privacy Litig., 
66 F. Supp. 3d. 1197, 1214 (N.D. Cal. 2014)). 
 89. Although these courts take a variety of approaches, what they hold in common is that 
plaintiffs have standing when they allege that a data breach caused them an increased risk of 
future harm. E.g., In re Zappos.com, Inc., 888 F.3d 1020, 1024, 1027–28 (9th Cir. 2018); Attias, 865 
F.3d at 628–29; Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App’x. 384, 388 (6th Cir. 2016). 
 90. Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693. 
 91. In re U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt. Data Sec. Breach Litig., 928 F.3d 42, 58, 60 (D.C. Cir. 
2019). 
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Circuit noted, “[w]hy else would hackers break into a store’s database 
and steal consumers’ private information?”92 The purpose of a hack is 
presumably to sooner or later commit a fraudulent act, leading to a 
clear risk of harm.93 This approach tends to find that plaintiffs have 
standing, which is the correct result. But the approach still examines 
whether plaintiffs will suffer injuries subsequent to the data breach, 
which is improper reasoning. 
For example, the Sixth Circuit in Galaria v. Nationwide Mutual held 
that plaintiffs had standing for FCRA violations and common law 
claims because there was imminence of future harm as soon as the 
plaintiffs’ information was “in the hands of ill-intentioned criminals.”94 
In Galaria, hackers breached Nationwide, a large insurance and 
financial services company.95 The Sixth Circuit found that the plaintiffs 
had standing despite that it was not “literally certain” the plaintiffs’ 
data would be misused.96 Similarly, in Remijas v. Neiman Marcus, the 
Seventh Circuit found that the plaintiff had standing following a breach 
of Neiman Marcus, a luxury department store. The court found that the 
plaintiffs had standing because “the risk that Plaintiffs’ personal data 
will be misused by the hackers . . . is immediate and very real.”97 
Additionally, some of the plaintiffs had already suffered fraudulent 
charges on their credit cards by the time of the lawsuit,98 which helped 
indicate that those who had not yet faced fraudulent charges almost 
certainly would soon.99 
Under this approach, plaintiffs may have standing even when they 
plead that the precise amount of harm may not be clear for “some 
time.”100 For example, in the Ninth Circuit case In re Zappos.com, a 
hacker stole credit card information of over 24 million individuals from 
Zappos.com; the plaintiffs then alleged that they “[might] not see the 
full extent of identity theft or identity fraud for years.”101 Yet, the court 
 
 92. Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Galaria, 663 F. App’x. at 388. 
 95. Id. at 386. 
 96. Id. at 388. 
 97. Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693 (quoting In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d. 
1197, 1214 (N.D. Cal. 2014)). 
 98. Id. at 689–90. 
 99. Id. at 693–94 (“The plaintiffs are also careful to say that only 9,200 cards have 
experienced fraudulent charges so far; the complaint asserts that fraudulent charges and identity 
theft can occur long after a data breach.” (emphasis in original)). 
 100. In re Zappos.com, Inc., 888 F.3d 1020, 1028–29 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 101. Id. 
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found that the plaintiffs had standing regardless of potential delay in 
harm because the thieves already had “all the information . . . needed 
to open accounts or spend money in the plaintiffs’ names.”102 
Additionally, the type of data exposed—that is, whether it is 
particularly sensitive to misuse—may matter.103 The Zappos court, for 
example, found it important that credit card numbers are particularly 
vulnerable to identity theft.104 And in In re U.S. Office of Personnel 
Mgmt.,105 the D.C. Circuit found that the plaintiffs had standing 
following a hack of the United States Office of Personnel Management 
in part because social security numbers and fingerprint records were 
especially sensitive to misuse.106 
C. Third Approach: An Increased Risk of Harm After a Data Breach 
is Not an Injury in Fact 
The third approach used by courts is that a data breach by itself 
cannot generally indicate a cognizable injury regardless of whether 
there is an increased risk of future misuse. Courts that refuse to find 
standing for claims of increased risk of future harm tend to do so 
because plaintiffs rely on too many assumptions, making an actual 
injury “hypothetical.”107 To these courts, victims’ credit card and bank 
statements may be “exactly the same today as they would have been 
had [a] database never been hacked.”108 That is, a data breach itself 
constitutes mere means to real harm.109 
In Beck v. McDonald, the Fourth Circuit found that the plaintiffs 
did not have standing after the data breach of a hospital because the 
plaintiffs could not show their information was or would be misused.110 
 
 102. Id. at 1023, 1026. 
 103. In re U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt. Data Sec. Breach Litig., 928 F.3d 42, 58, 60 (D.C. Cir. 
2019); Zappos, 888 F.3d at 1027–28. 
 104. Zappos, 888 F.3d at 1027–28 (discussing the particular sensitivity of credit card 
information). 
 105. Plaintiffs brought claims under the Federal Information Security Management Act of 
2002, 44 U.S.C. §§ 3541, et seq. (2012) (repealed 2014), and the Federal Information Security 
Modernization Act of 2014 (“FISMA 14”), 44 U.S.C. §§ 3551 et seq. (2018). Both acts provided 
required software security steps for federal agencies. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 928 F.3d at 51. 
 106. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 928 F.3d at 49, 58, 60. The court also found standing in part because 
some plaintiffs had already suffered harm. 
 107. Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 42 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 108. Id. at 45. 
 109. See, e.g., Whalen v. Michaels Stores, Inc., 698 F. App’x. 89, 91 (2d Cir. 2017) (finding a 
data breach of a brick-and-mortar retailer does not itself constitute an injury in fact for individuals 
whose information was exposed). 
 110. Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 275–76 (4th Cir. 2017). 
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The plaintiffs relied on the Privacy Act of 1974, which applies to federal 
agencies.111 A Veterans Affairs Medical Center had lost personal 
information of 7,400 patients after a laptop went missing, likely from 
theft.112 The Fourth Circuit found that although a violation of the 
Privacy Act was potentially a concrete injury, the plaintiffs did not 
demonstrate that future harm was imminent.113 Plaintiffs neither met 
the “certainly impending” threshold for harm nor the lesser standard 
of “substantial risk” of future harm.114 It was not enough that 
objectively thirty-three percent of the plaintiffs would suffer identity 
theft—a fact that the court accepted as true for the analysis of 
standing—because the other sixty-six percent “w[ould] suffer no 
harm.”115 To find standing, the court would have had to make 
unfounded assumptions in an “attenuated chain.”116 
Similarly, in In re SuperValu, the Eighth Circuit refused to hold that 
the plaintiffs had standing after hackers stole credit card information 
from computer systems of over 1,000 SuperValu grocery stores.117 
Plaintiffs sued the grocery store chain under state statutory and 
common law claims.118 The court found that although the plaintiffs 
demonstrated the possibility of future harm, mere possibility was not 
enough.119 Credit card information did not alone indicate a high 
likelihood of fraudulent use because no accompanying “personally 
identifying information,” such as birth dates or social security numbers, 
was stolen.120 Accordingly, there was little risk that a bad actor could 
“open unauthorized accounts in the plaintiffs’ names.”121 The court 
thought that there was still a risk of “unauthorized charges” using 
existing credit card accounts, but that risk was not enough to indicate a 
“substantial risk” of harm sufficient for standing.122 
In Wilding v. DNC Services Corp., the Eleventh Circuit found that 
being the victim of a data breach does not alone mean plaintiffs have 
 
 111. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2018); 5 U.S.C. § 552(f) (2018). 
 112. Beck, 848 F.3d at 267. 
 113. See id. at 271 n.4 (discussing that some other circuits, following Spokeo, have found 
violation of a privacy statute to be a de facto concrete injury). 
 114. Id. at 268, 275–76. 
 115. Id. at 268. 
 116. Id. at 275. 
 117. In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763, 765 (8th Cir. 2017). 
 118. Id. at 767. 
 119. Id. at 771–72. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Id. 
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standing under common law.123 The court stated that “[t]here is 
admittedly some support for the notion that the mere violation of a 
state-law right satisfies Article III even in the absence of an identifiable 
injury.”124 But nonetheless, “[w]e require plaintiffs asserting violations 
of state-created rights to demonstrate a concrete injury; the defendant’s 
violation of those rights is not enough.”125 In Wilding, registered 
Democrats and donors to the Democratic National Committee 
(“DNC”) sued the DNC after hackers breached its servers during the 
2016 Presidential election.126 The Wilding plaintiffs formed multiple 
classes, one of which alleged a simple breach of fiduciary duty.127 That 
class did not have standing.128 
D. Analyzing the Split 
A few trends emerge from the circuit split regarding standing in 
data breach cases.129 First, plaintiffs tend to bring suits under state law, 
grounded in federal diversity jurisdiction, rather than under federal 
statutes.130 This is likely due to a lack of federal statutory causes of 
action available, leading to difficulty finding federal question 
jurisdiction.131 For example, FCRA only applies to consumer reporting 
agencies,132 and the Privacy Act only applies to federal agencies.133 
Second, however, cases that do hinge on federal statutes fare 
significantly better than those that hinge on state law. Plaintiffs had 
standing in all but one case where a federal statute was in question. 
Beck is the one case based on a federal statute where the court did not 
find that plaintiffs had standing, but Beck is perhaps unique. In Beck, 
the Fourth Circuit refused to find that plaintiffs had standing for claims 
brought under the Privacy Act after a laptop containing sensitive 
 
 123. Wilding v. DNC Servs. Corp., 941 F. 3d 1116, 1130 (11th Cir. 2019). 
 124. Id. at 1131. 
 125. Id. 
 126. Id. at 1122–23. 
 127. Id. at 1130. 
 128. Id. A different class of plaintiffs that alleged actual financial loss did have standing 
because “[s]uch economic harm is a well-established injury for purposes of Article III standing.” 
Id. at 1125. In this way, the court seemingly followed the second approach of the circuit split. 
Supra Part II.B. 
 129. The analysis of Part II.D is based on each cited case reviewed in Parts II.A–C. 
 130. This finding based on each cited case reviewed in Parts II.A–C, plus prior or ancillary 
precedent not discussed. 
 131. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2018). 
 132. 15 U.S.C. § 1681(b) (2018). 
 133. 5 U.S.C. § 552a (2018) (laying out requirements for agencies); 5 U.S.C. § 552(f) (2018) 
(defining “agency”). 
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personal information went missing.134 But the Fourth Circuit later 
found that plaintiffs had standing in Hutton, a case with state law claims 
and strong evidence of impending future harm. However, the cases can 
be reconciled. The court explained, “[i]n Beck, the plaintiffs alleged 
only a threat of future injury in the data breach context where a laptop 
and boxes . . . had been stolen, but the information contained therein 
had not been misused.”135 Moreover, the court “concluded that the 
threat was speculative because ‘even after extensive discovery’ there 
was ‘no evidence that the information contained on [a] stolen laptop 
[had] been accessed or misused or that [the plaintiffs had] suffered 
identity theft.’”136 Thus, it seems the Beck plaintiffs did not have 
standing from a lack of specificity in their pleadings and scant evidence 
after discovery.137 Therefore, the Fourth Circuit may find that plaintiffs 
have standing if they allege more than just theft itself.138 
Also notable is that the Third Circuit has both granted and denied 
standing for data breach cases alleging a risk of future injury. These 
cases can also be reconciled. In Ceridian, the court refused to find that 
standing existed for state common law claims stemming from a 
cyberattack because even with some possibility of future harm, the risk 
was too speculative.139 But the court found that plaintiffs had standing 
in Horizon, a case brought after suspected laptop theft, which hinged 
on FCRA.140 These cases taken together indicate that the Third Circuit 
affords great weight to decisions of Congress to create federal causes 
of action via legislation. 
III. THE PROPER FRAMEWORK FOR STANDING 
All three current approaches to standing are improper because a 
data breach causes an inherently cognizable legal injury the moment 
that information is exposed or acquired. In Horizon, the Third Circuit 
came close to this approach but only when plaintiffs alleged harm 
under the FCRA federal statute.141 A more proper approach would 
extend that framework to common law claims: that “the unauthorized 
 
 134. Beck v. McDonald, 848 F.3d 262, 267 (4th Cir. 2017). 
 135. Hutton v. Nat’l Bd. of Exam’rs in Optometry, Inc., 892 F.3d 613, 621–22 (4th Cir. 2018). 
 136. Id. at 622. 
 137. Id. 
 138. Beck, 848 F.3d at 275. 
 139. Reilly v. Ceridian Corp., 664 F.3d 38, 41, 46 (3d Cir. 2011). 
 140. In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 639 n.20 (3d Cir. 
2017). 
 141. See supra notes 72–86 and accompanying text. 
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dissemination of personal information . . . causes an injury in and of 
itself—whether or not the disclosure of that information increased the 
risk of identity theft or some other future harm.”142 This approach is in 
line with long-recognized tort law and contract law principles. 
Additionally, because a data breach itself causes a cognizable injury, 
Clapper’s framework requiring plaintiffs to show that future harm is 
imminent should not govern data breach cases. Clapper was about 
injuries based entirely on a speculative future event. However, a data 
breach case is about a past event: the unauthorized disclosure of 
information. Finding standing through this approach also upholds 
standing’s main purpose of separation of powers. 
A. Unauthorized Disclosure of Information is an Injury in and of Itself 
After hackers access sensitive personal information, the initial 
reaction of victims may, unsurprisingly, be alarm.143 Indeed, in any data 
breach, an unauthorized third-party accesses a victim’s private 
information.144 In some cases, merely a social security number with its 
corresponding name can be enough for a bad actor to commit identity 
theft.145 However, if data breaches are harmful because of the fraud to 
which they lead, one could argue that there is no harm in a data breach 
itself. It may be unsettling when information that was expected to be 
kept confidential by its steward is exposed. Still, to build a case for why 
data breach plaintiffs have standing, that exposure must be 
contextualized under a legal theory of harm. This Section lays such a 
framework and explains why a data breach is an inherently cognizable 
injury under common law tort and contract regimes. 
1. Data Breaches as Tortious Invasions 
Experts maintain that “[i]t’s totally reasonable to assume that your 
social security number has been compromised at least once, if not many 
times,”146 and that “repercussions of a breach can be very delayed, 
 
 142. St. Pierre v. Retrieval-Masters Creditors Bureau, Inc., 898 F.3d 351, 357 (3d Cir. 2018) 
(quoting Horizon, 846 F.3d at 639). 
 143. See In re U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt. Data Sec. Breach Litig., 928 F.3d 42, 49 (D.C. Cir. 
2019) (“[T]he data breaches affected more than twenty-one million people. Unsurprisingly, given 
the scale of the attacks and the sensitive nature of the information stolen, news of the breaches 
generated not only widespread alarm, but also several lawsuits.”). 
 144. Symantec, What Is a Data Breach?, NORTON, https://us.norton.com/internetsecurity-
privacy-data-breaches-what-you-need-to-know.html (last visited Dec. 9, 2019). 
 145. Paul Wagenseil, What to Do After a Data Breach, TOM’S GUIDE (Apr. 15, 2019), 
https://www.tomsguide.com/us/data-breach-to-dos,news-18007.html. 
 146. Suzanne Rowan Kelleher, Everyone’s Social Number Has Been Compromised. Here’s 
WASSERMAN FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/2020  10:46 AM 
2020] DATA BREACHES AS ARTICLE III INJURIES 219 
sometimes not fully manifesting for years.”147 It would follow, then, that 
many individuals have already had their social security number 
compromised yet are unaware, unflinching, and unharmed. Under 
these circumstances, perhaps it might be correct to view a data breach 
as not itself an injury in fact. The common law, after all, does not 
recognize unconsented information disclosure as injurious unless the 
disclosure is “harmful to one’s reputation or otherwise offensive.”148 
However, the mere exposure of information from a data breach is 
intuitively offensive because sensitive private facts are disseminated, 
which may cause anxiety over the threat of looming injuries or 
embarrassment.149 This “value of mental suffering” has long been 
recognized in American law, a seminal conception of which was 
asserted in 1890150 in The Right to Privacy.151 In that essay, Justice Louis 
Brandeis and Samuel Warren argued that the invasion of privacy, like 
defamation, should be actionable.152 Indeed, modern privacy torts,153 
including “unreasonable publicity” and “breach of confidence,” protect 
against such exposure.154 Both of those torts are actionable so long as 
pleadings allege that a third party gained unauthorized access to the 
 
How to Protect Yourself., FORBES (Aug. 1, 2019, 1:42 P.M.), https://www.forbes.com/sites/ 
suzannerowankelleher/2019/08/01/everyones-social-security-number-has-been-compromised-
heres-how-to-protect-yourself/#4848379a29ac. 
 147. Lily Hay Newman, supra note 14, at ¶ 4. 
 148. In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 639 (3d Cir. 2017). 
 149. Robert C. Post, The Social Foundations of Privacy: Community and Self in the Common 
Law Tort, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 957, 964 (1989) (“An intrusion on privacy is intrinsically harmful 
because it is defined as that which injures social personality.” (emphasis in original)). 
 150. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652A (2016) (“The right of privacy has been 
defined as the right to be let alone. Prior to 1890 no English or American court had ever expressly 
recognized the existence of the right, although there were decisions that in retrospect appear to 
have protected it in one manner or another.”). 
 151. Samuel D. Warren & Louis D. Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193, 213 
(1890). 
 152. Id. at 218–19. 
 153. RESTATEMENT, supra note 150, § 652A (enumerating the four ways in which privacy is 
invaded); David A. Elder, Privacy Torts § 1:1 (2016). 
 154. See Kamal v. J. Crew Grp., Inc., 918 F.3d 102, 114 (3d Cir. 2019) (describing unreasonable 
publicity and breach of confidence as “[h]arms actionable under traditional privacy torts”); In re 
Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 638–39 (3d Cir. 2017) (“And 
with privacy torts, improper dissemination of information can itself constitute a cognizable 
injury.”); Post, supra note 149, at 964 (“[T]he privacy tort enables a plaintiff to make out his case 
without alleging or proving any actual or contingent injury, such as emotional suffering or 
embarrassment. The privacy tort shares this profile with other torts which redress ‘dignitary 
harms.’”); Alan B. Vickery, Breach of Confidence: An Emerging Tort, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1426, 
1455 (1982) (“[T]he tort can be defined in general terms as the unconsented, unprivileged 
disclosure to a third party of nonpublic information that the defendant has learned within a 
confidential relationship.”). 
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plaintiffs’ information.155 A data breach is no different. A hacker is an 
intruding third party who gains unauthorized access to plaintiffs’ 
information through a steward entrusted with it.156 
The Supreme Court confirmed in Doe v. Chao that for “privacy and 
defamation torts,” damages are “presumed . . . without reference to 
specific harm.”157 Logically, if damages are presumed, then so should be 
standing.158 The Third Circuit even noted in Horizon that because 
damages to one’s privacy are “uncertain and possibly unmeasurable,” 
privacy tort victims may be awarded money damages that are 
“calculated without proving actual damages.”159 To that end, courts 
should, at least for standing purposes, presume injury regardless of how 
plaintiffs might label their injuries, whether as certain torts or simply 
negligence.160 
The suggested limiting principle to this approach is that data breach 
plaintiffs must still factually show either that they lost control over their 
information or that a bad actor gained unauthorized access to it. This 
threshold will almost always be met when a case arises from a hack, 
which is by definition unauthorized access to data.161 But plaintiffs in 
laptop theft cases may face greater burdens. For example, in a case of 
laptop theft where personal information is stored on the laptop, privacy 
is invaded as soon as the laptop is in the hands of an unintended 
recipient.162 Then, individuals whose information is accessible within 
 
 155. Kamal, 918 F.3d at 114; Horizon, 846 F.3d at 638–39; Vickery, supra note 154, at 1455. 
 156. See Alicia Solow-Niederman, Beyond the Privacy Torts: Reinvigorating a Common Law 
Approach for Data Breaches, 127 YALE L.J.F. 614, 627–28 (2018) (arguing that an organization 
entrusted with data is a “data confidant” with fiduciary duties). 
 157. Doe v. Chao, 540 U.S. 614, 621 (2004); see also Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 
1549 (2016) (“[T]he law has long permitted recovery by certain tort victims even if their harms 
may be difficult to prove or measure.”). 
 158. See Lauren E. Willis, Spokeo Misspeaks, 50 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 233, 249 (2017) (arguing 
that “the Supreme Court has never blinked at” the presumption of damages in libel and 
defamation suits, and so “the question of standing” need not be raised). 
 159. Horizon, 846 F.3d at 638–39. 
 160. E.g., In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763, 767 (8th Cir. 2017) (mentioning that the 
plaintiffs raised negligence claims); Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 696–97 
(7th Cir. 2015) (addressing claims that the defendant was negligent in protecting the plaintiffs’ 
information). 
 161. Tripwire Guest Authors, The Evolution of Hacking, TRIPWIRE.COM (Aug. 17, 2016), 
https://www.tripwire.com/state-of-security/security-data-protection/cyber-security/the-evolution 
-of-hacking/. 
 162. See In re Zappos.com, Inc., 888 F.3d 1020, 1023 (9th Cir. 2018) (“[In Krottner] we held 
that employees of Starbucks had standing to sue the company based on the risk of identity theft 
they faced after a company laptop containing their personal information was stolen.”); Krottner 
v. Starbucks Corp., 628 F.3d 1139, 1143 (9th Cir. 2010) (“Here, Plaintiffs-Appellants have alleged 
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have suffered a cognizable injury.163 But if a thief steals a laptop that 
does not actually store information—e.g., if the information is stored 
on a cloud server—164 the laptop theft alone might not implicate a 
cognizable injury because no personal information was exposed, 
acquired, or otherwise accessed.165 Therefore, with a hack, it will 
generally be clear whether a bad actor accessed private information.166 
But standing in laptop theft cases may not be immediately clear, 
depending the facts at hand.167 This limiting factor does not cut against 
a court’s ability to label a data breach as a common law injury; instead, 
it merely recognizes that there might be cases where a data breach is 
factually difficult to establish as having occurred at all. 
Once it is established the plaintiffs’ information was accessed 
without authorization, any alleged “increased risk of future harm” 
stemming from that data breach is harm anchored to and extending 
from it.168 For example, plaintiffs may allege that because of a data 
breach, they face an increased risk of identity theft.169 Thus, potential 
future harm simply adds to the harm from the data exposure itself. 
Courts should therefore evaluate that likelihood of future harm as an 
inquiry into causation and damages during later phases of litigation: 
Did the data breach proximately cause the alleged future harm, and if 
so, then how much is that predicted harm worth?170 The Ninth Circuit 
took this approach in Zappos, stating “[t]hat hackers might have stolen 
 
a credible threat of real and immediate harm stemming from the theft of a laptop containing their 
unencrypted personal data.”). 
 163. Horizon, 846 F.3d at 642 (Schwartz, J., concurring). 
 164. See Wendy Zamora, Should You Store Your Data in the Cloud?, MALWAREBYTES LABS 
(July 26, 2018), https://blog.malwarebytes.com/101/2016/04/should-you-store-your-data-in-the-
cloud/ (explaining that data stored in the “cloud” is not physically on a single computer). 
 165. The plaintiffs in Beck, where the Fourth Circuit found that the plaintiffs did not have 
standing, may still not have standing even under the approach proposed in this Note. Hutton v. 
Nat’l Bd. of Exam’rs in Optometry, Inc., 892 F.3d 613, 622 (4th Cir. 2018) (“[W]e concluded [in 
Beck] that the threat was speculative because ‘even after extensive discovery’ there was ‘no 
evidence that the information contained on [a] stolen laptop [had] been accessed or misused or 
that [the plaintiffs had] suffered identity theft.’”). 
 166. E.g., Zappos, 888 F.3d at 1023 (noting that the defendant told customers that their 
personal information had been stolen); Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App’x. 384, 
386 (6th Cir. 2016) (noting that the defendant acknowledged the data breach occurred and 
advised customers to monitor their bank statements to prevent misuse of stolen data). 
 167. Hutton, 892 F.3d at 622. 
 168. See Horizon, 846 F.3d at 642 (“While [loss of privacy] may or may not be sufficient to 
state a claim for relief under Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), the intangible harm from the loss of privacy 
appears to have sufficient historical roots to satisfy the requirement that Plaintiffs have alleged a 
sufficiently concrete harm for standing purposes.”). 
 169. See supra notes 94–99 and accompanying text (discussing circuit cases in which plaintiffs 
alleged an increased risk of identity theft or other harm as caused by data breaches). 
 170. Id.; Zappos, 888 F.3d at 1029. 
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Plaintiffs’ [personally identifying information] in unrelated breaches, 
and that Plaintiffs might suffer identity theft or fraud caused by the 
data stolen in those other breaches (rather than the data stolen from 
Zappos), is less about standing and more about the merits of causation 
and damages.”171 
Perhaps more importantly, data breach victims may buy 
prophylactic services to protect themselves from the risk of identity 
theft.172 Victims, for example, may buy credit monitoring services in 
direct response to their credit card numbers being compromised.173 
Such time and money spent to “set things straight” indicates an injury 
in fact.174 Any court that may have trouble concluding that 
unauthorized data disclosure is a cognizable injury should surely, once 
the plaintiffs allege actual purchase of mitigation expenses, find 
standing. These mitigation expenses, if reasonable, are not 
manufactured or self-imposed.175 They reflect non-speculative, “actual 
injuries” because the harm already occurred, and the risk of future 
fraud is “sufficiently immediate to justify mitigation efforts.”176 These 
expenses can include costs to investigate and monitor potential fraud, 
to cancel and re-issue credit cards,177 or simply “the time value of 
money” and legwork used to stop the bleeding caused by a data 
breach.178 
Additionally, the hacker and the compromised steward of 
information may both be at fault for plaintiffs’ injuries.179 Whether the 
defendant actually violated the law or whether an ill-intentioned 
hacker is solely at fault is not a question of Article III standing.180 And, 
 
 171. Zappos, 888 F.3d at 1029. 
 172. In re 21st Century Oncology Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 380 F. Supp. 3d 1243, 
1256–57 (M.D. Fla. 2019). 
 173. See Dieffenbach v. Barnes & Noble, Inc., 887 F.3d 826, 828 (7th Cir. 2018) (“[T]he value 
of one’s own time needed to set things straight is a loss from an opportunity-cost perspective. 
These injuries can justify money damages, just as they support standing.”). 
 174. Id. 
 175. See Lewert v. P.F. Chang’s China Bistro, Inc., 819 F.3d 963, 967 (7th Cir. 2016) 
(confirming that “the time and money spent resolving fraudulent charges are cognizable injuries 
for Article III standing” and that expenses to replace cards and purchasing credit monitoring 
services are reasonable mitigation costs after a data breach). 
 176. Id. 
 177. In re Equifax, Inc., Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 371 F. Supp. 3d. 1150, 1160 (N.D. 
Ga. 2019). 
 178. Dieffenbach, 887 F.3d at 828. 
 179. See Remijas v. Nieman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 696 (7th Cir. 2015) (“The fact 
that Target or some other store might have caused the plaintiffs’ private information to be 
exposed does nothing to negate the plaintiffs’ standing to sue.” (emphasis in original)). 
 180. See Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 628 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“Here, by contrast, an 
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to the extent these fault determinations matter for standing, they go to 
traceability, not whether a plaintiff suffered an injury in fact. The Sixth 
Circuit in Galaria noted that “[a]lthough hackers are the direct cause 
of Plaintiffs’ injuries, the hackers were able to access Plaintiffs’ data 
only because [the defendant] allegedly failed to secure the sensitive 
personal information entrusted to its custody,” and “[t]h[o]se 
allegations meet the threshold for Article III traceability.”181 If a court 
decides that the risk of identity theft or fraud is not the compromised 
organization’s fault, that determination will be made after standing has 
been established.182 Therefore, if a data breach lawsuit must be 
dismissed, it should be dismissed on the merits under Rule 12(b)(6),183 
on summary judgment184 or after a trial, not for the plaintiffs’ lack of 
standing.185 
Relatedly, some circuit courts suggest that the type of data 
compromised should affect standing analysis.186 These courts are 
correct that the type of data stolen affects the likelihood that a bad 
actor will misuse it.187 Personal information varies and can include 
biometric data,188 bank account numbers,189 or home address 
 
unauthorized party has already accessed personally identifying data on CareFirst’s servers, and it 
is much less speculative—at the very least, it is plausible—to infer that this party has both the 
intent and the ability to use that data for ill.”); Remijas, 794 F.3d at 696. 
 181. Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App’x. 384, 390 (6th Cir. 2016) (attributing 
questions of causation to “traceability” in the opinion, not to questions of if plaintiffs suffered an 
injury in fact). 
 182. In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 642 (3d Cir. 2017) 
(Schwartz, J., concurring); Remijas, 794 F.3d at 696. 
 183. Horizon, 846 F.3d at 642. 
 184. FED. R. CIV. P. 56. 
 185. E.g., Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 500 (1975) (“Although standing in no way depends 
on the merits of the plaintiffs’ contention that particular conduct is illegal, it often turns on the 
nature and source of the claim alleged.”) (emphasis added); Wilding v. DNC Servs. Corp., 941 
F.3d 1116, 1128 (11th Cir. 2019) (“Whether a plaintiff has Article III standing is a question distinct 
from whether she has a statutory cause of action.”). 
 186. See, e.g., In re U.S. Office of Pers. Mgmt. Data Sec. Breach Litig., 928 F.3d 42, 59 (D.C. 
Cir. 2019) (discussing “the nature of the information stolen” and “governmental character of the 
databases at issue”); In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763, 769 (8th Cir. 2017) (“We need not 
reconcile this out-of-circuit precedent [of data breach cases] because the cases ultimately turned 
on the substance of the allegations before each court.”). 
 187. Zak Doffman, New Data Breach Has Exposed Millions of Fingerprint and Facial 
Recognition Records: Report ¶ 2, FORBES (Aug. 14, 2019, 4:31 A.M.), https://www.forbes.com/ 
sites/zakdoffman/2019/08/14/new-data-breach-has-exposed-millions-of-fingerprint-and-facial-
recognition-records-report/#6086b48e46c6 (“The issue with biometric data being stored in this 
way is that, unlike usernames and passwords, it cannot be changed. Once it’s compromised, it’s 
compromised. And for that reason this breach report will sound all kinds of alarms.”). 
 188. Office of Pers. Mgmt., 928 F.3d at 68 (addressing a data breach where fingerprints were 
exposed). 
 189. E.g., In re Zappos.com, Inc., 888 F.3d 1020, 1023 (9th Cir. 2018). 
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information.190 Stolen information may also be stale, or out of date, and 
thus less valuable to hackers.191 But the type of data stolen should not 
affect whether plaintiffs have standing. The type of data compromised 
is a question of how much plaintiffs were harmed or whether the 
plaintiffs’ mitigation costs were reasonable, not whether the plaintiffs 
have standing.192 
2. Data Breaches as Breaches of Contract 
Alternative to theories of harm grounded in tort law are those 
grounded in contract law, especially in jurisdictions that follow the 
economic-loss doctrine.193 Under the economic-loss doctrine, courts 
may refuse to recognize economic losses under tort law when the 
parties have already chosen to order those same rights by express 
contract.194 Indeed, many data breach plaintiffs bring causes of action 
under breach of contract,195 of which there are three key formulations: 
(1) a plaintiff’s express contract with the defendant to protect data,196 
(2) a plaintiff’s implied contract with the defendant to protect data,197 
or (3) a plaintiff as a third-party beneficiary of an express contract 
between the defendant and another party, like a database vendor.198 In 
each case, plaintiffs have standing as soon as they reasonably allege 
breach of a valid contract. 
 
 190. Lily Hay Newman, supra note 14, at ¶ 1. 
 191. Data Breach, MALWAREBYTES, https://www.malwarebytes.com/data-breach/ (last 
visited Dec. 9, 2019) (discussing how stolen data that is at least “two to three years old” is still 
valuable to hackers). 
 192. See Galaria v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 663 F. App’x. 384, 386 (2016) (“Plaintiffs’ 
allegations of a substantial risk of harm, coupled with reasonably incurred mitigation costs, are 
sufficient to establish a cognizable Article III injury at the pleading stage of the litigation.”). 
 193. David Balser et al., supra note 7, at ¶ 18 (“It remains to be seen whether Schnuck Markets 
will gain traction outside the Seventh Circuit, but no court has rejected the Seventh Circuit’s 
reasoning and one district court has relied on Schnuck Markets to dismiss financial institutions’ 
claims.”). 
 194. Cmty. Bank of Trenton v. Schnuck Mkts., Inc., 887 F.3d 803, 812 (7th Cir. 2018) (quoting 
Indianapolis-Marion Cty. Pub. Library v. Charlier Clark & Linard, P.C., 929 N.E.2d 722, 729 (Ind. 
2010)) (“The reason for this rule is that ‘liability for purely economic loss . . . is more 
appropriately determined by commercial rather than tort law,’ i.e., by the system of rights and 
remedies created by the parties themselves.”). 
 195. E.g., Hutton v. Nat’l Bd. of Exam’rs in Optometry, Inc., 892 F.3d 613, 616 (4th Cir. 2018); 
In re SuperValu, Inc., 870 F.3d 763, 771 n.6 (8th Cir. 2017); Remijas v. Nieman Marcus Grp., LLC, 
794 F.3d 688, 690 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 196. E.g., Kuhns v. Scottrade, Inc., 868 F.3d 711, 717 (8th Cir. 2017). 
 197. SuperValu, 870 F.3d at 767 (addressing a breach of implied contract claim). 
 198. Rottlund Homes of N.J., Inc. v. Saul, Ewing, Remick & Saul, L.L.P., 243 F. Supp. 2d 145, 
153 (D. Del. 2003). 
WASSERMAN FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE) 4/21/2020  10:46 AM 
2020] DATA BREACHES AS ARTICLE III INJURIES 225 
First, plaintiffs may allege that the targeted and compromised 
organization breached an express contract to “protect [plaintiffs’] 
sensitive information.”199 Plaintiffs who bring these claims essentially 
have automatic standing because a plaintiff who is a party to an express 
contract “has a judicially cognizable interest for standing purposes, 
regardless of the merits of the breach alleged.”200 A stock brokerage, 
for example, may owe to its customers an express contractual 
obligation to “maintain sufficient security measures and procedures to 
prevent unauthorized access” to data.201 Such a financial institution 
may also explicitly promise its customers that it will “use security 
measures,” such as encryption, to “comply with federal law.”202 
Plaintiffs still face a burden to allege that a defendant breached an 
express contractual provision; bare assertions that the defendant failed 
to protect data may prove insufficient.203 However, assuming pleadings 
show that defendants breached an express contract, plaintiffs should 
simply have standing. 
Second, plaintiffs have standing when they allege that a defendant 
organization breached an implied contract to take reasonable steps to 
protect data.204 Certainly, a defendant may be at fault for a legal injury 
caused by a data breach if the defendant was contractually obligated to 
try to prevent the data breach.205 Plaintiffs, however, may face a 
challenge convincing a court that an implied contract actually exists 
because an implied contract is “not formally or explicitly stated in 
words.”206 That is, the existence of an implied contract must be inferred 
from the parties’ conduct given the facts and circumstances of a case, 
rather than referencing an explicit written agreement.207 
 
 199. Case v. Miami Beach Health Grp., Ltd., 166 F. Supp. 3d 1315, 1318–19 (S.D. Fla. 2016). 
 200. SuperValu, 870 F.3d at 771 n.6. 
 201. Scottrade, 868 F.3d at 717. 
 202. Id. 
 203. See id. (holding that plaintiffs merely alleged “bare assertions that Scottrade’s efforts 
failed to protect customer [personally identifiable information]” and that “even if the security 
representations can be construed as promises of contract performance, the lengthy Consolidated 
Complaint fails to allege a specific breach of the express contract”). 
 204. SuperValu, 870 F.3d at 771 n.6 (quoting Carlsen v. GameStop, Inc., 833 F.3d 903, 909 (8th 
Cir. 2016)) (internal quotations omitted). 
 205. Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64, 72 (1st Cir. 2012) (“From an analytical standpoint, 
we think . . . that when a plaintiff generally alleges the existence of a contract, express or implied, 
and a concomitant breach of that contract, her pleading adequately shows an injury to her 
rights.”). 
 206. Dawes Min. Co. v. Callahan, 267 S.E.2d. 830, 831–32 (Ga. App. 1980), aff’d 272 S.E.2d 
267 (Ga. 1980)). 
 207. Id.; Enslin v. The Coca-Cola Co., 136 F. Supp. 3d 654, 675 (E.D. Pa. 2015). 
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These evidentiary differences make standing for the breach of an 
implied contract more difficult to demonstrate than for breach of an 
express contract. In SuperValu, for example, the Eighth Circuit found 
that the plaintiffs did not have standing because they failed to show 
that they were a party to an implied contract with a grocery store to 
“take reasonable steps to protect” data.208 Although the SuperValu 
court did not rule out that the breach of an implied contract could ever 
be adequate for standing,209 the court could have read the pleadings 
more leniently. Given the facts and circumstances, a better outcome 
would have been that the plaintiffs had standing. A reasonable grocery 
store customer “[o]rdinarily . . . does not expect—and certainly does 
not intend—the merchant to allow unauthorized third-parties to access 
[transmitted] data,” nor does a customer ever reasonably intend that 
their credit card information be provided to anyone but the 
merchant.210 Undoubtedly, it would have been proper to conclude that 
the grocery stores had an implied contractual duty to “take reasonable 
measures to protect [customer] information.”211 
Moreover, the existence of an implied contract will be even less 
dubious if a defendant disseminates a privacy policy, regardless of 
whether the defendant is a brick and mortar business212 or a website.213 
For example, the privacy policy on Yahoo’s website has been held to 
constitute a contract to “employ reasonable safeguards” to protect 
users’ personal information, despite Yahoo not specifically promising 
to invest time or money in cybersecurity.214 Alternatively, a hotel chain’s 
privacy policy that states the hotel is committed to safeguarding 
customer information may constitute an enforceable promise sufficient 
for standing.215 Such a contractual duty may extend to guests for the 
period of time in which they stay on hotel premises.216 Similarly, health 
care providers will likely be bound by implied contracts to protect 
 
 208. SuperValu, 870 F.3d at 771 n.6 (internal quotations omitted). 
 209. See id. (“Even if such analysis applies to an implied contract—a question we need not 
decide here—the complaint does not sufficiently allege that plaintiffs were party to such a 
contract.”). 
 210. Anderson v. Hannaford Bros. Co., 659 F.3d 151, 159 (1st Cir. 2011). 
 211. Id. 
 212. Walters v. Kimpton Hotel & Rest. Grp., LLC, 2017 WL 1398660, at *1–2 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 
13, 2017). 
 213. In re Yahoo! Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 2017 WL 3727318, at *48 (N.D. Cal. 
Aug. 30, 2017). 
 214. Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. 
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patients’ data from thieves.217 Health care providers may represent 
themselves as promising to protect personal information in their 
agreements with patients, website announcements, or press releases.218 
Then, patients agree to give up their sensitive personal information in 
exchange for the provider’s “implicit and inescapable representation[]” 
that the health care provider will at least do “something” to protect 
patient information.219 Plaintiffs may still not have standing if they 
allege the breach of an implied contract but without actual resulting 
injuries or damages.220 And some courts do not consider the release of 
sensitive personal information without evidence of misuse to be an 
adequate injury.221 But, as argued earlier in this Note, a data breach 
causes a cognizable legal injury both in terms of mental suffering222 and 
actual financial loss incurred to purchase preventative services.223 
Finally, under the third-party beneficiary doctrine, plaintiffs may 
have standing to sue for breach of contract even when they are not a 
party to the contract at issue. For example, a defendant in a data breach 
case may have entered into a contract with another company in which 
that company agreed to help the defendant protect its electronic 
business records. Those records may have included the plaintiffs’ data 
with which the defendant was entrusted. In such a case, the defendant 
and the other company are co-stewards of the plaintiffs’ information, 
and the plaintiffs are third-party beneficiaries of that contract.224 Under 
the third-party beneficiary doctrine, plaintiffs in such a case need only 
show that there was a contract “made for the[ir] benefit . . . within the 
intent and contemplation of the contracting parties.”225 Essentially, 
“benefits flow to both the promisee and the third party, and either may 
sue to enforce the contract.”226 In a data breach case, a plaintiff might 
 
 217. Lozada v. Advocate Health & Diagnostic Corp., 2018 WL 7080045, at *6 (Ill. App. Ct. 
Dec. 24, 2018). 
 218. Id. at *2. 
 219. Id. 
 220. E.g., Cherny v. Emigrant Bank, 604 F. Supp. 2d 605, 608 (S.D.N.Y. 2009). 
 221. Id. 
 222. See supra notes 142–156 and accompanying text. 
 223. See supra notes 172–178 and accompanying text. 
 224. E.g., Mendez v. Hampton Court Nursing Ctr., LLC, 203 So. 3d 146, 148 (Fla. 2016); 
Flaherty & Collins, Inc. v. BBR-Vision I, L.P., 990 N.E.2d 958, 971 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013). 
 225. Rottlund Homes of N.J., Inc. v. Saul, Ewing, Remick & Saul, L.L.P., 243 F. Supp. 2d 145, 
153 (D. Del. 2003). 
 226. In re Spong, 661 F.2d 6, 10 (2d Cir. 1981); see also Beckett v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n, 995 
F.2d 280, 286 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (“[I]t is a fundamental principle of contract law that parties to a 
contract may create enforceable contract rights in a third party beneficiary.”); RESTATEMENT 
(SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 304 (1981) (illustrating the third-party beneficiary doctrine). 
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allege breach of an express provision requiring a database vendor to 
protect the compromised defendant’s information.227 Prior to the 
Capital One data breach discussed above,228 where a hacker accessed 
over 100 million credit card numbers, Capital One had contracted with 
Amazon Web Services (“AWS”) to store Capital One’s data and 
software applications on cloud servers operated by AWS.229 Potential 
liability following the Capital One data breach has not yet settled,230 
but the individual victims of the data breach could arguably sue to 
enforce the contract as third-party beneficiaries.231 Each individual 
Capital One customer was a third-party beneficiary, with standing to 
sue for breach of contract, assuming the intent of the contract between 
Capital One and AWS was to protect customers’ credit card data or it 
included a provision to the same effect.232 It is worth noting that such 
contracts might validly prohibit third-party suits.233 But whether a 
contract bans third-party beneficiary suits is a question of contract 
interpretation, not of whether a contract exists or if there is threshold 
standing.234 
3. Federal Statutory Reinforcement 
Common law considerations aside, plaintiffs in data breach cases 
may sue under federal statutory authority. And when a plaintiff sues 
under a federal statute, existence of a cognizable injury should be even 
 
 227. E.g., Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64, 73 (1st Cir. 2012). 
 228. See supra note 4 and accompanying text (discussing the Capital One data breach) 
 229. Cloud Security at AWS is the Highest Priority, AMAZON WEB SERVS. (2015), 
https://aws.amazon.com/campaigns/cloud-transformation/capital-one/. 
 230. See Kevin LaCroix, Guest Post: Is Amazon Liable for the Capital One Hack?, D&O 
DIARY (Aug. 19, 2019), https://www.dandodiary.com/2019/08/articles/cyber-liability/guest-post-
is-amazon-liable-for-the-capital-one-hack/ (suggesting that AWS could be liable for the Capital 
One data breach and stating that “just about every corporate data breach that involves a third 
party vendor results in some level of finger-pointing between the two”). 
 231. See id. at “The AWS/Capital One Contract” (restating provisions of the contract 
between Capital One and AWS and concluding that “[t]he above provisions are not ambiguous, 
and clearly define data security responsibilities to belong to the AWS customer”). 
 232. Id. 
 233. In re Heartland Payment Sys., Inc. Customer Data Sec. Breach Litig., 2011 WL 1232352, 
at *1, *18 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 31, 2011); Pa. State Emps. Credit Union v. Fifth Third Bank, 398 F. 
Supp. 2d 317, 324 (M.D. Pa. 2005) (“While [The Restatement, adopted here by the state] 
recognizes that a nonsignatory to a contract can be an intended beneficiary of the contract if 
certain conditions are met, it recognizes the right of the contracting parties to exclude third parties 
from invoking the benefits of their agreement.”); see also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
CONTRACTS § 302 (1981). 
 234. See Katz v. Pershing, LLC, 672 F.3d 64, 72–73 (1st Cir. 2012); Heartland Payment Sys., 
2011 WL 1232352, at *16–18 (discussing third-party suits in the context of Rule 12(b)(6)). 
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less dubious than if it were under common law.235 Sometimes, a statute 
provides plaintiffs a cause of action by simply elevating the legal status 
of a common law harm.236 Or, Congress may enact a statute to “give 
rise to a case or controversy where none existed before.”237 In either 
case, federal statutes introduce to standing analysis rights that Congress 
deliberately sought to protect.238 For example, the disclosure of 
personal information became a de facto injury when Congress enacted 
FCRA.239 Labeling an event like a data breach as a de facto injury may 
appear to ignore the requirement that an injury be “actual or 
imminent,” essentially collapsing analysis to only address the 
“particularized” and “concrete” requirements. But there is no need to 
address imminence of future harm alleged in such a case because the 
loss of privacy caused by a data breach is an actual and present injury.240 
To be sure, Congress could enact legislation that specifically creates 
a private right of action for data breach victims, as suggested by many 
commentators.241 This Note does not address the intricacies or political 
practicality of such a federal statute, other than agreeing that such an 
enactment is a good idea. A federal statute aimed at broadly providing 
data breach victims with a cause of action would likely eliminate many 
challenges plaintiffs face in satisfying standing requirements.242 Such a 
statute would also advance the public policies later outlined in Part IV 
of this Note.243 
 
 235. See In re Horizon Healthcare Servs. Inc. Data Breach Litig., 846 F.3d 625, 639–40 (3d 
Cir. 2017) (quoting Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1549 (2016)) (“[S]ince the ‘intangible 
harm’ that FCRA seeks to remedy ‘has a close relationship to a harm [i.e. invasion of privacy] 
that has traditionally been regarded as providing a basis for a lawsuit in English or American 
courts,’ we have no trouble concluding that Congress properly defined an injury that ‘give[s] rise 
to a case or controversy where none existed before.’”). 
 236. Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 578 (1992). 
 237. Spokeo, 136 S. Ct. at 1549 (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 580 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
 238. E.g., id.; Horizon, 846 F.3d at 634. 
 239. Horizon, 846 F.3d at 639 (“[W]ith the passage of FCRA, Congress established that the 
unauthorized dissemination of personal information by a credit reporting agency causes an injury 
in and of itself—whether or not the disclosure of that information increased the risk of identity 
theft or some other future harm.”). 
 240. Id. at 641 (Schwartz, J., concurring) (“Plaintiffs allege[d] that the theft of the laptops 
caused a loss of privacy, which is itself an injury in fact.”). 
 241. E.g., Michael Hopkins, Your Personal Information Was Stolen? That’s an Injury: Article 
III Standing in the Context of Data Breaches, 50 U. PAC. L. REV. 427, 445–46 (2019); Lorio, supra 
note 23, at 127. 
 242. Lorio, supra note 23, at 127–28. 
 243. Relatedly, bailment of intangible property may be a promising theory of harm. However, 
courts to date barely address data bailment, other than nothing that “[i]n certain circumstances, 
intangible property may be the subject of a bailment.” Richardson v. DSW, Inc., 2005 WL 
2978755, at *4 (N.D. Ill. Nov. 3, 2005); see also Weitz & Luxenberg, Bailment Claims: A Cause of 
Action In Data Breach Cases, WIETZ & LUXENBERG BLOG (Apr. 14, 2015), 
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B. Courts Misunderstand Clapper’s Application to Data Breach 
Lawsuits 
Because of the above delineations of legal harm, Clapper’s 
requirement that plaintiffs show that future harm is “imminent” should 
not apply to data breach lawsuits; Clapper’s facts and those of data 
breach cases markedly differ. A data breach is generally a past and 
confirmed event, with victims’ personal information exposed or 
acquired.244 On the other hand, Clapper involved allegations of 
potential wiretapping by the federal government, which was a 
speculative future occurrence.245 Further, the plaintiffs’ claims in 
Clapper were based exclusively on those future wiretapping claims 
occurring.246 However, none of the plaintiffs had been wiretapped, nor 
did any of them have knowledge that the government would ever 
wiretap them.247 Rather, the plaintiffs’ allegations were based on a 
series of assumptions and contingencies.248 The plaintiffs alleged (1) 
that the government planned to imminently target their 
communications;249 (2) that the government’s choice to target the 
plaintiffs’ communications was pursuant to the Foreign Intelligence 
Surveillance Act, as opposed to a different federal power;250 and (3) that 
after the government targeted the plaintiffs’ communications, a 
separate set of decisionmakers would then actually authorize the 
surveillance.251 The Court refused to find that the plaintiffs had 
standing because they had merely alleged a “chain of possibilities” 
 
https://www.weitzlux.com/blog/2015/04/14/bailment-claims-cause-action-data-breach-cases/ 
(discussing a lack of data bailment cases). Even in such a case, plaintiffs still need to allege the 
elements of traditional bailment. In re Target Corp. Data Sec. Breach Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1154, 
1177 (D. Minn. 2014) (“Plaintiffs are correct that intangible property such as their personal 
financial information can constitute property subject to bailment principles, they have not—and 
cannot—allege that they and Target agreed that Target would return the property to them.”). If 
data bailment claims’ validity as legitimate claims on the merits are unclear, then so are questions 
of standing. 
 244. Remijas v. Nieman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 245. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 410–11 (2013). 
 246. Id. at 402. 
 247. Id. at 411. 
 248. Id. 
 249. Id. 
 250. Id. at 412. Additionally, whether the government surveilled the plaintiffs pursuant to 
Section 702 of the Foreign Intelligence Act was a question of traceability, not just of whether 
there was an injury in fact. Id. at 410–11. That is, the plaintiffs had to show that their alleged 
injuries were fairly traceable to the government acting under that specific statute. The plaintiffs 
failed to show such traceability. Id. 
 251. Id. at 413. 
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requiring “guesswork as to how independent decisionmakers will 
exercise their judgment.”252 
A data breach lawsuit is far removed from those facts because the 
unauthorized exposure of data already has already occurred; it is not a 
speculative or assumed future occurrence.253 Additionally, any 
subsequent future harm caused by a data breach, like identity theft or 
fraud, stems from and is closely attached to that previous data breach.254 
These distinguishing facts alone limit Clapper’s applicability. 
Accordingly, Clapper’s requirement that injuries be “certainly 
impending” should not control standing for data breach suits. Instead, 
courts should, at a minimum, use the lower standard of “substantial 
risk” of future harm or, with sufficient facts alleged, use neither and 
find that an “actual” injury occurred. 
Some circuit courts properly recognize this distinction. The Seventh 
Circuit in Remijas noted that in Clapper “there was no evidence that 
any of the [plaintiff]s’ communications either had been or would be 
monitored.”255 But in a data breach case, there is “no need to speculate” 
because information has already been stolen.256 The Ninth Circuit 
similarly in Zappos stated that a laptop thief has “all the information 
he need[s] to open accounts or spend money in the plaintiffs’ names.”257 
In contrast, identifying harm in Clapper had required a “speculative 
multi-link chain of inferences.”258 Clapper provides guidance for 
analyzing standing but should by no means be used to force imminence 
analysis into data breach cases. 
C. By Treating Data Breaches as Inherently Injurious, Courts Do Not 
Risk Undermining Standing’s Role as a Separation of Powers 
Doctrine 
Standing is grounded in separation of powers principles, ensuring 
that courts rule on only “cases” and “controversies,” rather than 
 
 252. Id. at 413–14. 
 253. E.g., Attias v. Carefirst, Inc., 865 F.3d 620, 628 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (“Here, by contrast, an 
unauthorized party has already accessed personally identifying data on CareFirst’s servers, and it 
is much less speculative—at the very least, it is plausible—to infer that this party has both the 
intent and the ability to use that data for ill.”); Remijas v. Nieman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 
688, 692–93 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 254. Attias, 865 F.3d at 628. 
 255. Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693 (quoting In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 
1197, 1214 (N.D. Cal. 2014)). 
 256. Id. (quoting Adobe, 66 F. Supp. 3d at 1214). 
 257. In re Zappos.com, Inc., 888 F.3d 1020, 1026 (9th Cir. 2018). 
 258. Id. 
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creating de facto legislation by ruling on hypothetical situations.259 A 
data breach and its fallout are not such hypothetical situations. In a data 
breach lawsuit, plaintiffs sue to redress their private legal rights over an 
event that has already occurred. It is possible that after a case on the 
merits a defendant organization may not be at fault, but to make those 
determinations, courts must allow data breach cases to proceed. 
Besides, hackers obtain information with the intent to misuse it.260 
Whether the breached organization is at fault for that misuse not a 
question of standing.261 By finding that data breach plaintiffs have 
standing, courts do not risk usurping the power of the legislative or 
executive branches.262 
IV. POLICY CONSIDERATIONS 
There are several policy considerations weighing in favor of finding 
that data breach plaintiffs have standing in addition from the above 
legal analysis. Concluding that a data breach is harmful in and of itself 
makes good practical sense. 
A. The “Wait and See” Approach Unnecessarily Harms Both 
Consumers & Companies 
Harm need not have already occurred or be “literally certain” to 
constitute an injury in fact.263 Likewise, every data breach victim need 
not have already suffered actual identity theft or fraud to suffer a 
legally cognizable injury.264 Such a policy benefits plaintiffs by allowing 
them to redress their injuries quickly so that future or ongoing harm is 
minimized.265 A similar principle applies to why courts grant 
preliminary injunctions.266 As soon as a victim’s information is exposed, 
 
 259. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 401, 408 (2013). 
 260. Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693. 
 261. Zappos, 888 F.3d at 1029. 
 262. Joslin, supra note 19, at 754 (“Data breach litigation typically takes the form of private 
individuals suing to redress their own private rights. In this context, there is no threat of judicial 
entanglement in political disputes, nor is there concern about the judiciary usurping political 
powers.”). 
 263. In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1215 (N.D. Cal. 2014) (quoting 
Clapper, 568 U.S. at 414 n.5). 
 264. Id. 
 265. Univ. of Tex. v. Camenisch, 451 U.S. 390, 395 (1981) (“The purpose of a preliminary 
injunction is merely to preserve the relative positions of the parties until a trial on the merits can 
be held. . . . A party thus is not required to prove his case in full at a preliminary-injunction 
hearing.”). 
 266. See Jeffrey M. Sanchez, The Irreparably Harmed Presumption? Why the Presumption of 
Irreparable Harm In Trademark Law Will Survive eBay And Winter, 2011 B.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 
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that victim has already suffered an injury in fact. And each day that 
victim any other victim must wait to seek redress, they will suffer even 
more harm in the form of looming or ongoing misuse of their data.267 
In some cases, a portion of plaintiffs have already experienced fraud by 
the time they sue, with others expecting data misuse “sooner or 
later.”268 From a policy standpoint, customers “should not have to wait 
until hackers commit identity theft or credit-card fraud in order to 
[have] standing.”269 
When plaintiffs ultimately bring suit is a difficult decision. Proving 
and winning large money damages may be easier if plaintiffs wait to 
sue after a data breach, allowing for more harm to definitively 
materialize.270 Meanwhile, the more time that passes between a data 
breach and litigation, the more latitude a defendant has to argue a lack 
of causation.271 Either way, a plaintiff’s decision of when to sue should 
not be made for them by an improper conception of Article III 
standing. 
Companies may also benefit from earlier data breach lawsuits 
because they value certainty in both financial burdens272 and legal 
liability.273 If a lawsuit is inevitable, a breached organization, in addition 
 
535 (2011) (“[A] preliminary injunction serves to ‘stop the bleeding’ early on in litigation and can 
mitigate potential damage to the trademark owner’s reputation.”); Jim Barr Coleman, Digital 
Photography and the Internet, Rethinking Privacy Law, 13 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 205, 214 (2005) 
(“Traditionally, the purpose of a preliminary injunction is that you stop the bleeding.”). 
 267. Remijas v. Nieman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 694 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting U.S. 
GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-07-737: REPORT TO CONGRESSIONAL REQUESTERS: 
PERSONAL INFORMATION 29 (2007)), https://www.gao.gov/new.items/d07737.pdf) (“Further, 
once stolen data have been sold or posted on the Web, fraudulent use of that information my 
continue for years.”). 
 268. Id. at 693–94. 
 269. Id. at 693. 
 270. Id. 
 271. Id. (quoting In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Privacy Litig., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1215 n.5 (N.D. Cal. 
2014)). 
 272. See, e.g., Will Kenton, Certainty Equivalent Definition, INVESTOPEDIA, 
https://www.investopedia.com/terms/c/certaintyequivalent.asp (last updated Apr. 21, 2019) 
(“Investments must pay a risk premium to compensate investors for the possibility that they may 
not get their money back and the higher the risk, the higher premium an investor expects over 
the average return. . . . A company seeking investors can use the certainty equivalent as a basis 
for determining how much more it needs to pay to convince investors to consider the riskier 
option.”). 
 273. See, e.g., John R. Allison, Five Ways to Keep Disputes Out of Court ¶ 1, HARV. BUS. REV. 
(Feb. 1990), https://hbr.org/1990/01/five-ways-to-keep-disputes-out-of-court (“[T]here are few 
things managers dread more than litigation. Even petty cases have a way of damaging 
relationships, tarnishing reputations, and eating up enormous sums of money, time, and talent.”); 
Thomas H. Belknap Jr., Calculating Settlement Value of a Case ¶ 1, BLANK ROME LLP (Apr. 
2014), https://www.blankrome.com/publications/calculating-settlement-value-case-0. 
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to trying to avoid substantial monetary liability, may want to resolve 
the lawsuit as soon as possible.274 For that reason in particular, 
companies may value forcing plaintiffs into arbitration.275 Or if 
arbitration is not possible, companies may prefer federal class actions 
because they can resolve every claim in a single action, even when the 
litigation presents a risk of sweeping adverse outcomes.276 By no means 
do all companies necessarily agree. “For corporate interests, class 
actions are often viewed as a two-edged sword, offering enormous risks 
and tremendous opportunities to resolve outstanding litigation issues 
in one fell swoop.”277 But denying standing to data breach plaintiffs 
prevents this route altogether by forcing plaintiffs to postpone lawsuits, 
leaving companies guessing as to when they will finally be served. 
B. Federal Class Actions Are More Efficient Than State Suits 
Granting standing to plaintiffs in data breach cases will not burden 
companies with lawsuits any more than they otherwise would face. 
Even if plaintiffs had immense difficulty proving standing, they would 
likely still bring federal suits, just later, once more harm materialized. 
Although plaintiffs can always bring data breach suits in state courts, 
where the plaintiffs would likely more easily have standing,278 it seems 
likely that plaintiffs would continue in federal courts. In federal courts, 
plaintiffs may take advantage of the plaintiff-friendly Class Action 
Fairness Act (“CAFA”),279 multi-district litigation (“MDL”) that 
allows plaintiffs to consolidate cases nationally,280 and federal statutes 
like FCRA. Moreover, plaintiffs in federal court can still bring state law 
 
 274. See David Rosenberg, Mass Tort Class Actions: What Defendants Have and Plaintiffs 
Don’t, 37 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 393, 430 (2000) (“[D]efendant firms are structured to operate risk 
neutrally and have many means of hedging against risk, notably derived from laws limiting 
liability and affording protection in bankruptcy, opportunities for stockholders to diversify their 
portfolios, and widespread availability of liability insurance.”). 
 275. See Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Arbitration Everywhere, Stacking the 
Deck of Justice ¶¶ 1–3, N.Y. TIMES (Oc. 21, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/01/business/ 
dealbook/arbitration-everywhere-stacking-the-deck-of-justice.html (discussing arbitration 
clauses as a method for companies to circumvent the court system). 
 276. James M. Underwood, Rationality, Multiplicity & Legitimacy: Federalization of the 
Interstate Class Action, 46 S. TEX. L. REV. 391, 403 (2004). 
 277. Id. 
 278. Willis, supra note 158, at 253–54 (citing state court cases from Michigan, Alaska, 
California, New Jersey). 
 279. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005 (“CAFA”), Pub. L. 109-2 (2005). 
 280. 28 U.S.C. § 1407 (2018) (laying out “multidistrict litigation” standards). 
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claims, like the powerful California Consumer Privacy Act (“CCPA”)281 
under diversity jurisdiction.282 
Finding that data breach plaintiffs have standing will also be 
unlikely to increase companies’ litigation burdens because the many 
tools at federal courts’ disposal increase judicial efficiency. Through 
economies of scale in class action suits, defendants can amalgamate 
evidence; and plaintiffs no longer need to bring scattered and distinct 
state suits.283 Although state court systems wield their own class action 
statutes,284 federal courts are likely more efficient for plaintiffs and 
defendants alike to adjudicate national data breach incidents. 
C. Consumers as “Private Attorneys General” Help Create Proper 
Corporate Cybersecurity 
The more likely it is that a company will face legal liability following 
a data breach, the more incentivized that company will be to adopt 
robust cybersecurity practices.285 Finding that plaintiffs have standing 
in data breach cases will increase the ease at which victims can bring 
suits, and companies will in turn invest in privacy infrastructure to deter 
and prevent would-be hackers.286 Companies already have compelling 
 
 281. Cal. Civ. Code § 1798.100 (West 2020). 
 282. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2018). 
 283. See David Rosenberg, supra note 274, at 394 (“With class-wide aggregation of the 
defense interest, the defendant exploits economies of scale to invest far more cost-effectively in 
preparing its side of the case than plaintiffs can in preparing their side.”). 
 284. E.g., Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.220 (1993). 
 285. Although deterrence is often discussed in terms of how damages should be calculated 
and imposed, the deterrent effects of more permissively letting suits proceed with standing should 
have a similar effect, as if damages for civil liability were increased. See John C. Manning, Going 
Back to Scrap in Order to Refine Steel: The Supreme Court Loosens the Modern Constraints on 
the Doctrine of Standing in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services (TOC), 
Inc., 10 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 215, 230–31 (2001) (discussing that “an award of civil penalties . . . 
would prevent the defendant’s conduct through deterrence”); Timothy Stoltzfus Jost & Sharon 
L. Davies, The Empire Strikes Back: A Critique of the Backlash Against Fraud and Abuse 
Enforcement, 51 ALA. L. REV. 239, 266 (1999) (“In tort cases, it has been argued that damages 
should normally be calibrated to achieve what is referred to as ‘optimal deterrence,’ i.e., damages 
should be set sufficiently high to ensure that a tortfeasor fully internalizes all the costs that her 
conduct imposes on a victim . . . .”). 
 286. The idea of deterrence through threat of liability is exemplified in antitrust law, in which 
the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (2018), allows private plaintiffs to collect treble damages, 
thereby incentivizing private citizens to zealously sue companies for antitrust violations. See Ill. 
Brick Co. v. Illinois, 431 U.S. 720, 745–46 (1977) (discussing the legislative intent behind treble 
damages to be enforcement by “private attorneys general”); Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe 
Mach. Corp., 392 U.S. 481, 484 (1968) (“Treble-damage actions, the importance of which the 
Court has many times emphasized . . . .”); Jason Wasserman, Apple v. Pepper: Applying the 
Indirect Purchaser Rule to Online Platforms, 14 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y SIDEBAR 147, 
153 (2019) (quoting Illinois Brick, 431 U.S. at 746) (“In large part, the rule was created to 
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reasons to protect their data. Data breach litigation costs companies 
millions of dollars in legal expenses, computer system rehabilitation 
costs, and bad press.287 But finding that plaintiffs have standing will 
provide an even greater incentive to improve cybersecurity practices 
without coercion.288 Compromised organizations, often corporations, 
are also least-cost avoiders289 for improving privacy infrastructure in 
the United States. If and when companies do ultimately adopt strong 
cybersecurity practices, the companies should in theory be 
compromised less often. 
CONCLUSION 
Cyberattacks and subsequent data breaches increase every year, 
depriving individuals control of their personal information. Whether it 
is the breached company’s fault, or solely the fault of the hacker, 
depends on the merits of each case, and plaintiffs should be able to 
bring lawsuits against breached organizations swiftly and reliably to 
resolve those questions. Some courts, however, have wrongly found that 
data breach victims do not have standing because the future harm 
caused by a data breach is too “speculative.” But the exposure of 
information from a data breach is an injury in and of itself. Courts 
should find that victims of data breaches suffer injuries in fact sufficient 
for standing the moment that their information is disclosed without 
their consent. Doing so will reinforce common law rights, efficiently 
resolve liability, and better protect consumers. 
 
 
incentivize private antitrust actions by direct purchasers, or so-called ‘private attorneys 
general.’”). 
 287. What’s the Real Cost of a Data Breach?, PKWARE BLOG, 
https://www.pkware.com/blog/what-s-the-real-cost-of-a-data-breach (last updated Sept. 2019). 
 288. See Air & Liquid Sys. Corp. v. DeVries, 139 S. Ct. 986, 997 n.3 (2019) (Gorsuch, J., 
dissenting) (quoting Nat’l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh v. Riggs Nat’l Bank of Washington, 
D.C., 5. F.3d 554, 557 (D.C. Cir. 1993)) (“‘Placing liability with the least-cost avoider increases 
the incentive for that party to adopt preventive measures’ that will ‘have the greatest marginal 
effect on preventing the loss.’”). 
 289. See Alan Butler, Products Liability and the Internet of (Insecure) Things: Should 
Manufacturers Be Liable for Damage Caused By Hacked Devices?, 50 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 913, 
916 (2017) (“[H]olding manufacturers liable for downstream harms caused by their insecure 
devices is well aligned with the purposes of products liability law—to minimize harm by 
encouraging manufacturers (as a least-cost-avoider) to invest in security measures.” (emphasis 
added)); Guido Calabresi, Civil Recourse Theory’s Reductionism, 88 IND. L.J. 449, 456–57 (2013) 
(discussing how the “first party” in an accident is often the “least-cost-avoider/best decider”). 
